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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses Illinois county government policies pertaining to the size, use, and 
replenishment of unreserved funds. As political forces push for reductions in taxes and in 
government itself, incentives for local governments to use less transparent means for managing 
finances increase. A better understanding of the impact which fund balance policies have on the 
amount of financial slack local governments keep on the one hand, and how counties use the 
funds on the other, is of increasing importance. This work expands on previous analyses of 
budgetary uncertainty and the possibility of using slack to stabilize service provision through 
times of revenue abundance and scarcity (Marlowe, 2004, 2005; Stewart, 2009, 2011a; Stewart, 
Hamman, and Pink-Harper, 2018; Tyer, 1993; Wang and Hou, 2012; Wolkoff, 1987).   
1. Introduction 
 In the face of sustained anti-government sentiment, governments often must get by with 
fewer financial resources.  Many taxpayers complain that too much personal income is paid to 
the government, only to be wasted; however, taxpayers also push back against service cutbacks 
that result from tax reductions.  As a result, state and local governments can experience serious 
cash flow shortfalls since they are required, by either statute or constitutional provision, to 
balance budgets.  Standards set forth by organizations such as the National Association of State 
Budget Officers (NASBO), the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), and the 
Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) recommend state and local governments 
maintain at least 5% of annual general fund expenditures as savings.  The GFOA recommends 
even more slack for local government, up to 15% or two months of operating expenditures.  
Whereas typically states set back such funds in formally designated “rainy day” accounts, local 
governments rely on informal approaches such as holding fund balances in unreserved 
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designations. Widely varying fund levels maintained by local governments suggest that there are 
general guidelines at best and local governments may have additional purposes in mind for these 
funds.  Consequently, a proper accounting of fund balances in a local government’s financial 
statement helps to assess the extent of its financial viability more accurately.  For instance, 
unreserved fund balance analysis can show whether resources are available for funding programs 
and paying debt.  High fund balances at the local level may show economic security and the 
ability to economize.  Indeed, the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) views 
moderately sized positive balances in unassigned general funds as a hedge against uncertainty, 
funds that may be drawn down to spend counter-cyclically to stabilize government services 
through economic business cycles, and a means to ensure stable tax rates.  However, large 
amounts of funds set aside in this way may also point to opportunities for reevaluating revenues 
and tax policies. Such surplus funds may trigger political pressure for tax cuts and/or increased 
spending.  
 The National Association of Counties (2016) reports that most states (32) require local 
governments to follow Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) from the Federal 
Accounting Standards Advisory Board.  Counties in other states also choose to comply such that 
a total of over 70% of U.S. counties follow GASB standards.  Approximately 19% of counties 
use other reporting formats decided by the state.  Another 10% of counties use GAAP approved 
statements but do not follow accrual accounting.  This is the case mainly for counties under 
50,000 in population.  Like local governments elsewhere, Illinois counties typically exceed these 
recommended levels of unreserved funds.  For instance, if you include all Illinois counties from 
for the decade of 2000 to 2010, unreserved funds as a percentage of total assets in real dollars 
range from about -600 to 100%.  As a percent of total net assets in real dollars, these funds range 
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from -1000 to 153% of annual expenditures.  However, in both cases, just a handful of counties 
for a few years are at these extremes (Pulaski and Union counties in the case of unreserved as a 
percentage of total assets - Champaign, Jefferson, Pulaski, and Williamson in some years if the 
base is total net assets).  Still, more than half of Illinois counties from 2000 to 2010 had large 
savings of more than 50% of total assets.  Like other states, most Illinois counties far exceed the 
spirit of the GFOA recommendations of two months or the 5 to 15% level of savings.   
 Public accountability concerning unreserved funds depends on transparency and reporting 
finances in ways that enable local officials and taxpayers alike to understand more clearly how 
government assets and liabilities are intended for different purposes.  Clearly understandable 
financial reports can facilitate the public debate needed by elected government officials and 
citizens to work toward balancing local government policy obligations with constituent interests.  
This paper focuses on one important way, using policies to manage unreserved general fund 
balances, for maintaining transparency and accountability.  Like many people, governments save 
and set aside monies for unforeseen circumstances. In fact, professional organizations like the 
GFOA recommend that local governments set money aside to be used for contingencies, budget 
stabilization, maintaining service levels, etc.  For these practices, GFOA recommends that 
governments develop and adopt formal policies to manage unassigned or carry over revenues to 
assist in properly utilizing these tax revenues.   
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2. Literature Review  
2.1 Unreserved General Fund Levels in Local Government 
 Compared to what is known about the states, budget scholars know considerably less about 
local government savings through budget cycles.  There are ample studies of state government 
savings and rainy day funds (Joyce, 2001; Navin & Navin, 1997; Vasche and Williams, 1987) 
and assessments of the impact of uncommitted funds on state budgets (Douglas and Gaddie, 
2002; Hou and Moynihan, 2008; Knight and Levinson, 1999; Pollock and  Suyderhoud, 1986).  
In contrast, just a few studies investigated these issues at the local level even though counties 
also budget unreserved funds (Stewart, 2009; Stewart, 2011; Stewart, 2011a; Stewart and 
Hamman, 2015; Wang and Hou, 2012) and cities do also (Hendrick, 2006; Marlowe, 2004, 2005; 
Tyer, 1993; Wolkoff, 1987).  
 Studies find that local government unreserved general fund balances vary considerably 
across jurisdictions.  Many exceed the GFOA’s recommended benchmark of 5-15% or two 
months of operating expenses.  With such variation, many argue it is not surprising that that 
GFOA’s one-size-fits-all benchmark does not apply to all jurisdictions in all circumstances.  
Rather, appropriate fund levels likely depend on numerous unique factors and contexts (Wolkoff, 
1987, 53).  Still, there is a point for each jurisdiction at which fund balances exceed the 
community’s contingency needs and at which point tax burdens increase unnecessarily (Massey 
and Tyer, 1990). 
 A growing body of research investigates factors affecting local government unreserved 
general fund balance levels and for what purpose the money is set aside. Generally, they find that 
economic, financial, demographic, and institutional factors explain some of the variation among 
cities and counties, but much of the variation is unexplained (Gianakis and Snow, 2007; 
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Hendrick, 2006; Marlowe, 2005; Massey and Tyer, 1990; Stewart, 2009, 2011a; Wang and  Hou, 
2012).  Given the large amounts maintained by some governments, researchers also questioned 
whether the monies were used for stabilization purposes (Marlowe, 2005; Wang and Hou, 2012). 
Marlowe, for example, found that although cities in Minnesota maintained a fund balance 
average of about 45%, these funds made only a marginal impact on expenditures and he 
questioned if there were other purposes for which these savings were maintained.  Studying local 
governments in North and South Carolina Shelton and Tyner found the range of fund balances 
was “considerably higher than most of the targets suggested by conventional wisdom and policy 
statements examined”.  They suggested it was “tempting to conclude that this means that cities 
are systematically maintaining excessive levels of fund balances”, but they conducted follow-up 
interviews and identified legitimate reasons for building large amounts of savings.  Local 
governments were building savings, for example, to replace capital equipment, for self-
insurance, and the construction of a major facility (Shelton and Tyner, 1999, 5).   
 Perhaps just as or even more concerning than the high fund balance levels that exceed GASB 
targets is the lack of transparency characterizing the processes for managing these slack 
resources.  Unreserved fund balances typically are not published in the budget and are 
documented only in audit reports or other financial statements.  These statements may be hard to 
understand or even locate.  Local elected officials unfamiliar with government finance may not 
be aware of these reserves (Stewart, Hildreth, and Antwi-Boasiako, 2015; Tyer, 1993).  Tyer 
(1993) suggested that local governments need to develop a comprehensive plan on how these 
funds should be managed and suggested that funds would be vulnerable to political influences 
without a plan.  He further added that having a plan would possibly result in citizens’ acceptance 
of savings and assisting with countering forces that could work against maintaining the funds as 
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well as curbing the appetites of spending agents.  The Government Finance Officers Association 
also recognized how vital planning was concerning these funds and developed a model to assist 
local governments with the creation of fund balance policies (GFOA, 2016).     
 It has been hypothesized that both the motivations of elected officials and governmental 
structure may influence savings. Blackley and Deboer highlight this issue of why states increased 
discretionary revenues during fiscal years 1991 and 1992.  They argued that despite the 
unpopularity of most discretionary revenue growth, there were “several motivations for elected 
official to increase revenues…. elected officials may feel that the marginal electoral benefits of 
expanded services outweigh the marginal electoral costs of higher discretionary revenues” 
(Blackley and Deboer, 1993, 2).  Stewart (2011) found that a political form of government (Beat 
systems) in Mississippi maintained more savings than an administrative form (Unit Systems).  
Consistent with Marlowe (2004), Stewart argued that finding was “contrary to the view that 
politicians are more concerned with short-term parochial needs to help with reelections” 
(Stewart, 2011, 20).  Evidence suggests that local elected officials are behaving more 
bureaucratically looking to longer-term policy goals rather than spending reserves on programs 
for which they can take more immediate credit.  
 
2.2 Illinois Counties and the Maintenance of Unreserved General Fund Balances 
 Illinois counties are governed and administrated as they have been for over a century.  
Progressive reforms that altered and modernized local government over the 20th century have not 
affected Illinois county governments until relatively recently. Historically, there have been two 
types of county structure and administration in Illinois.  Non-township counties, as the name 
implies, do not have townships (Walzer, Baird, and Gruild, 1990).  These are governed by three 
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commissioners elected at-large.  This elected commission then appoints a chairperson to preside 
over the commission (Walzer et. al, 1990).  Seventeen counties have non-township county 
governments.  Township counties have county boards consisting of five to twenty-nine elected 
members.  While regulated in previous constitutions, the 1970 constitution and statutes permit 
township counties to decide, within limitations, the size of the county board and whether the 
officials will be elected at-large or by districts (Kenney & Brown, 1993).  These members then 
make one of three choices.  The members can either choose to retain both the executive and 
legislative functions, elect a board president to assume executive functions, or hire a professional 
administrator (Walzer et. al, 1990).  Currently, only 20 Illinois counties employ professional 
administrators.   
 Townships are an important factor in county government since they can absorb some county 
government responsibilities dealing with general assistance to the poor, social welfare, and 
property assessment as well as construction and maintenance of roads and bridges (Hamilton, 
2008).  They are typically one of the lowest level taxing bodies and generally have limited 
responsibilities, only providing services that municipal governments fail to provide to 
unincorporated areas.  In commission form counties, the county government itself has to 
maintain the services provided by townships (Walzer et. al, 1990).1  Therefore, commission 
counties are expected to spend more pro-cyclically since they are more pressured to respond to 
an immediate need, particularly when unemployment increases during economic downturns.  
                                                          
1 Cook County is an exception as the only home-rule Illinois county with a county-executive 
form of government while Will County elected to adopt an executive form without home rule.   
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 In Illinois, a newer form of township county government, “the county administrator form” 
(Banovetz & Peters, 2006b), enables counties to adapt to modern demands.  It has been adopted 
by 20 Illinois township counties.  In these township counties, a county administrator form of 
government consolidates administrative operations into a single office that reports directly to the 
county board.  The position is then filled with a professional administrator that serves at the 
pleasure of the board in much the same fashion as city managers serve city councils in the 
council manager form.  County administrators in Illinois are responsible for directing the day-to-
day functions of administrative departments under the county board’s jurisdiction (Banovetz and 
Peters, 2006).  They are also responsible for approving and administering budgets for all elected 
county office holders and the county court system.   
 The question of how much counties should carry over in cash is not new.  In fact, in Illinois, 
this issue has been addressed many times through the years as the state legislature and watchdog 
groups recognized the need to set some guidelines (Federation, 2009).  Like 15 other states, 
Illinois does not formally require county governments to follow GAAP.  However, in practice, 
annual state comptroller audit reports comply with GAAP. 
(https://illinoiscomptroller.gov/services/local-government-division/).  From 2000 to 2010 on 
average, township counties maintained the largest proportion, .64, administrative professional 
and non-township county types maintain .57 and .56 of annual total expenditures, respectively. 
 
2.2.1 Illinois Constitution  
 Article 7 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution creates municipalities and units of local 
government, while Article 9 empowers the state and units of local government to levy and collect 
taxes.  Within the legal language, there is the strict requirement that non-property tax revenue, as 
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well as property tax revenue, must be reasonable.  For example, under Article IX, Section 2 of 
the Illinois Constitution addressing Non-Property Taxes, it states, “In any law classifying the 
subjects or objects of non-property taxes or fees, the classes shall be reasonable and the subjects 
and objects within each class be taxed uniformly.” The issue of defining what is reasonable has 
led to further clarification in state statutes and court opinions.  As part of this definition, there is 
legal guidance on how taxes can be levied and what services can be appropriated and spent on, as 
well as language addressing the amount of cash reserves that can be carried over under the 
“reasonable” doctrine (Grotto, 2008). 
 
2.2.2 Illinois Court Decisions 
 Illinois courts have warned against accumulating excessive amounts in unreserved fund 
balances (Grotto, 2008).  In one case pitting the citizens of the Lisle Township Road District 
against the district itself, the court ruled that without proper justification a unit of local 
government could not accumulate excess revenues (Allegis Reality Investors, Inc. v. Novac, 
2008).  While the term “excess" was left to the discretion of the courts, many courts have ruled 
that holding two to three times the amount of annual expenditures was illegal (Grotto, 2008).  
This issue for local governments, particularly for counties and townships located outside of Cook 
County that are authorized to levy taxes without limits, has been tested in the Illinois Supreme 
Court.  Through court cases, specifically Toynton v. Commonwealth Edison, the Illinois court 
system ruled against the unnecessary accumulation of tax money in the public treasury.  
According to a 1969 Illinois court case, Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Miller, 42 Ill. 2d 
542, units of local government are limited in their maximum cash reserves to approximately 
200% of the average expenses incurred over the past three years, and anything over this may be 
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considered excessive.   There have been multiple lawsuits brought forth in Illinois objecting to 
the cash accumulated by units of local governments citing the Miller threshold to question 
excessive taxing because of large cash accumulations.  
 
2.2.3 Illinois State Statutes 
 The Illinois State Statutes authorize counties to levy and collect taxes as well as to invest 
these revenues in financial instruments including bonds, savings accounts, certificates, money 
markets, securities, and public investment pools.  All such investments and deposits must meet 
strict criteria to protect the public’s interest (55 ILCS 5 Counties Code).  According to the 2013 
Illinois Property Tax Rate and Levy Manual, produced by the Illinois Department of Revenue, 
non-home rule counties with a population of 500,000 or more may create a property tax rate of 
.02% and or sell bonds for the purpose of developing a Working Cash Fund, “to enable the 
county to have in its treasury at all times sufficient money to meet demands for ordinary and 
necessary expenditures for general corporate purposes” (55 ILCS 5/6-2001).  The fund may not 
exceed an aggregate amount of $20,000,000.  Similarly, counties under 500,000 may create 
working cash funds with a slightly higher property tax rate not to exceed .025% for the same 
purpose of enabling the county to accumulate sufficient money to meet its operational needs. 
However, the statute does not set a maximum aggregate amount (55 ILCS 5/6-27003, 5/6-
27004).  Some state departments have weighed in on the question of what is an appropriate level 
of savings.  The Illinois State Comptroller’s office has acknowledged that maintaining positive 
unreserved fund balances may be beneficial for local governments but it has not set definite 
parameters as to how much should be saved (Illinois State Comptroller’s Office, 2004).  The 
Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity recommended maintaining a 
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minimum cash reserve of six months operating expenses (Township Officials of Illinois web-
post. www.toi.org/Resources/FAQ/).   
 
2.3 Professional Reporting Standards for Local Government Finance Reports 
 Professional norms and standards illuminate county budgetary and auditing practices within 
the boundaries established by the statutes and court rulings of a given state.  Generally accepted 
accounting principles set requirements for financial reporting and provide guidelines for 
supporting assessments of finances – to provide uniform financial reports.  Private sector 
businesses often abide by these guidelines although they are not required to do so.  Generally 
accepted accounting principles originate from efforts by the federal government in conjunction 
with professional accounting groups to create standards to prevent the manipulative role shady 
financial reporting played in bringing about the Great Depression of 1929.  Enforcement of 
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) laid a foundation for continued oversight. 
Currently, state financial reports comply with GAAP that is monitored and updated by the 
independent FASB.  About half of the states officially require local governments to follow 
GAAP guidelines and as many as 70% of local governments comply (Governmental Accounting 
Standards Board, 2008). 
 Independent agencies keep principles and reporting standards up-to-date.  The Financial 
Accounting Foundation (FAF) was formed in 1972 and oversees Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB).  The independent FASB was formed in response to recommendations from the 
American Institute of CPAs (AICPA) and has seven full-time members.  It is further overseen by 
a 30-person Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council.  The FAF appoints members of 
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FASB and the Governmental Accounting Standards Board and monitors actions to ensure 
transparency and fairness.  
 The GASB is an organization established in 1984 charged with creating GAAP for state and 
local government organizations. It aims to establish and improve standards of state and local 
governmental accounting (Government Accounting Standards Board, 2015). It utilizes GAAP to 
ensure greater accountability and well-informed decision making (Government Accounting 
Standards Board, 2015). Throughout the years, GASB has released over 80 statements and 
hundreds of recommendations for state and local governments (GAAP, 2017). We highlight two 
of the more relevant statements below.   
 
2.3.1 GASB Statement No. 34 
 Issued in June of 1999, Statement № 34 was found in one study to be ineffective in shaping 
financial report standards to achieve more clarity and consistency.  While the conditions for 
maintaining reserved fund balances were better understood by the users since it implied 
assigning assets for specific purposes, the unreserved fund balance brought confusion and 
inconsistency into the reporting process (Kelly, 2013).  As shown in Figure 1, the fund balance is 
the difference between assets and liabilities. It may also be viewed as the difference between 
revenues and expenditures and is reported in governmental accounts (Kelly, 2013).  This money 
is sometimes appropriated or carried forward to fund portions of the budget for the following 
year.  Under GASB 34, some portions may be formally reserved or legally restricted by law 
while other portions may be left as an informal reserve or unreserved fund balance.  However, 
the GASB believed the reserved and unreserved categories created confusion and was not well 
understood and resulted in inconsistent use in the application of the terms (Kelly, 2013). Figure 1 
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further shows that some portions of the unreserved fund balance are not designated and are 
treated as a “general operating reserve” or money received by governments but not spent 
(Massey and Tyer, 1990, 40).   
 
Figure 1. Fund Balance Depiction under GASB 34. 
 
 Since governments had an unclear level of discretion in determining whether funds should be 
designated for specific purposes or left undesignated to be spent at will, a great number of 
financial officers reported problems and errors in dealing with the unreserved fund balance 
(Kelly, 2013). In light of complaints and requests from users, the GASB conducted a survey 
following the implementation of Statement № 34 to learn that governments demonstrate 
significant differences in understanding the principles of fund balance accounting (Governmental 
Accounting Standards Board, 2006).  
 
 
Fund Balance 
(Assets - Liabilities) 
Reserved 
(formal) 
Appropriated 
working cash 
Unreserved 
(Informal) 
Undesignated 
(General Operating Reserve) Designated 
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2.3.2 GASB Statement No. 54 
 In response to the above-discussed issue, the GASB released statement № 54 in February of 
2009.  The objective of the statement was to spell out government fund type definitions in detail, 
and to provide new fund balance classifications in order to improve financial reporting and make 
it easier to understand (Government Accounting Standards Board, 2009).  It eliminated reserved 
and unreserved categories in favor of non-spendable, restricted, committed, assigned, and 
unassigned fund balances.  Moreover, governments were now required to disclose information 
about policies that regulate the distribution of funds between categories, constraints that are 
imposed on the amounts, as well as a designation within the fund in the notes to the financial 
reports (Government Accounting Standards Board, 2009).  
 Table 1 shows that the non-spendable category includes items (e.g., prepaid expenses and 
inventory) that are “not in spendable form or legally or contractually required to be maintained 
intact” (Government Accounting Standards Board, 2009, 3).  The Restricted category includes 
funds externally imposed by grantors, creditors, or other governments.  These resources are also 
“imposed by law through constitutional provisions or enabling legislation” (Ibid).  The 
Committed fund balance encompasses “amounts that can only be used for specific purposes 
pursuant to constraints imposed by formal action of the government’s highest level of decision-
making authority” (Ibid, 5).  The Assigned Fund Balance encompasses those funds “intended to 
be used for a specific purpose either by the action of the governing body or the delegation of that 
authority to another official (i.e., the city manager)” (Kelly, 2013, 728). The Unassigned Fund 
Balance includes monies “unassigned, or available to spend without restrictions.  This would 
include most nonspecific stabilization funds” (Ibid). 
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Table 1.  
New Categories of Fund Balance 
 
 Not only has this issue recently captured the attention of academic researchers, but also in 
1990 the GFOA, a professional association of state and local finance officers that served the 
public finance profession since 1906 (www.gfoa.org/main/about.shtml), acknowledged a lack of 
research and literature in this area; in part because public officials did not disclose this 
information to the public.  Interestingly, research suggests that public officials themselves do not 
pay adequate attention to fund balances or may not even be aware of these funds.  Even those 
public officials who are aware tend to focus more on the legal requirements of maintaining an 
annual balanced budget (Massey and Tyer, 1990; Tyer, 1993).  Tyer (1993) posits that, “when 
you talk to local government managers and finance officers, they will tell you that many local 
governments use reserve funds, although in some cases not given that formal designation, to plan 
for the future and avoid frequent tax increases” (Tyer, 1993, 75). By contrast, prior research 
indicated that this money often was unspent and not shown in the budget but rather in other 
financial documents like audits reports that were not readily accessible to the public (Tyer, 
1993). 
 For the most part, however, it is a common practice for local governments to maintain an 
unreserved fund balance rather than a formal reserve such as a rainy day fund (Tyer, 1993).  In 
GASB 34 GASB 54 
Reserved 
Nonspendable 
Restricted 
Committed 
Unreserved Assigned Unassigned  
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fact, they are encouraged by GFOA to do so. It was not until 2002 that the GFOA officially put 
on record a recommended practice for local governments to maintain no less than 5 to 15% of 
the general fund operating expenditures as an unreserved fund balance (Gauthier, 2002). 
 
3. Illinois Local Government “Saving” via Unreserved Fund Balances 
 Some slack resources in the budget are necessary for local governments’ fiscal health 
(Marlowe, 2013).  Convention holds that such slack helps stabilize expenditures and the 
provision of important local services through good and bad good economic times by tempering 
revenue volatility as well as helping meet unexpected service demands.  Not surprisingly, studies 
find most local governments hold unreserved or unassigned funds, but in many instances these 
funds may be in amounts far greater than necessary to meet revenue volatility or economic 
downturns.  For instance Hembree et al. (1999) found in a study of North Carolina and South 
Carolina municipalities that nearly all municipalities held some portion of the fund balances in 
reserve.  Carter and Vogt (1989) similarly found in an analysis of county and city fiscal 
responsibility that all jurisdictions maintained slack resources.  (Hembree et al., 1999) concluded 
that it was in almost every locality’s best interest to accumulate unreserved balances noting that 
the ideal amount was dependent on each government’s unique situation.   
 It is less well understood why local governments often hold large reserves and/or the roles 
these large fiscal reserves play in local government finance.  It is not clear whether the amount of 
slack many local governments maintain is appropriate.  Studies of local governments in several 
states, as well as in Illinois, suggest there are a number of factors and circumstances that may 
affect the size and use of unreserved or unassigned fund balances and this makes it difficult to 
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assess whether slack resources are excessive or not (Hendrick, 2006; Marlowe, 2005; Stewart, 
2009; Stewart, 2011; Stewart and Hamman, 2015; Stewart et al., 2018; Wang and Hou, 2012).   
 Most studies assess the effect that some combinations of socio-economic and institutional 
factors have on slack resources.  The relevant factors vary depending upon which study is 
considered. For instance, in a study of North Carolina counties, Wang and Hou (2012) tested 
whether volatility in revenue flow occurred over business cycles and intergovernmental factors 
affect the creation and use of slack resources in local government finance.  They found that 
property and sales tax effort as well as capital outlays relate positively to the size of budgetary 
slack. Population size and unemployment had a negative impact.  Marlow’s analyses of 
Minnesota and Michigan municipalities found that government perception of and response to its 
fiscal environment were the most important determinant and property tax revenues, rates of 
home ownership, and the burden of debt service mattered most (Marlowe, 2004 and 2005).  
Similarly, Gianakis and Snow (2007), who also focused on municipalities, found that wealthier 
communities more likely to hold unreserved fund balances and municipalities usually instituted 
these funds after experiencing a deep recession.  In addition, the funds were often used more to 
stabilize budgets when state aid decreased, rather than during economic downturns alone.   
 Other studies find similar dynamics at play in Mississippi counties’ unreserved fund balances 
(Stewart, 2009; Stewart, 2011). Counties in Mississippi maintain anywhere from negative 
balances to over 100% of annual expenditures in slack resources.  To assess whether Mississippi 
counties use slack to stabilize expenditures, the study analyzed county finances during economic 
upturn and downturn years.  This allowed the formulation of a more complete view of what and 
how certain variables impacted unreserved fund balances.  Property taxes, other revenues, and 
county per-capita income contributed positively to the size of unreserved fund balances during 
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times of economic prosperity.  This analysis also showed that counties with more debt per capita 
had smaller unreserved fund balances in both periods.  Counties with larger minority populations 
maintained smaller unreserved fund balances in economic downturns.  Faster growing counties 
tended to have less need for unreserved fund balances in both periods of resource abundance and 
scarcity.  The study also found that the form of county government affected unreserved fund 
balance levels.  Moreover, a significant relationship exists between the types of government, 
Beat or Unit, and the amount of fund balances held.  The Unit system models on more 
professional types of local government and institutionally separates political and administrative 
responsibilities by requiring that an elected board of supervisors appoint a county administrator 
to execute policy decisions.  The Beat system is the more traditional form that combines 
legislative and executive functions.  Typically, the Unit system holds fewer unreserved funds 
than Beat systems (Stewart, 2009; Stewart, 2011). 
 The findings for Illinois local government mirrors those found in other states. Analyzing the 
effects of variables such as revenue diversification, level of dependence on intergovernmental 
revenues, debt per capita, population change, and political ideology, Hendrick’s analysis of 
Chicago suburban municipalities found fiscal performance (i.e., operating surplus or deficit) 
most affected fund balances.  She argued that recognition of increased risk and a lack of “fiscal 
flexibility" resulted in more unreserved resources (Hendrick, 2006, 42).  The study concluded 
that unreserved fund balances were most important during fiscal downturns when maintaining 
reserves to compensate for risks became less important.   
 Fewer studies focus on the extent to which slack stabilizes budgets over business cycles and 
systematic evidence that local governments save money in good times and draw down slack in 
bad times is mixed.  In a study of North Carolina counties, Wang and Hou (2012) found no 
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evidence that North Carolina counties used slack counter-cyclically to stabilize expenditures 
over business cycles.  Alternatively, in his panel study of Minnesota cities, Marlowe (2005) 
found that unreserved general funds bolstered expenditures during economic downturns. A 
recent panel study of Illinois counties reported similar findings.  Taking a similar analytical 
approach,  Stewart et al. (2018) found that Illinois counties used unrestricted fund balances in 
governmental activity funds counter-cyclically. These results were also consistent with Hendrick 
who found slack to be most significant in downturns. 
 
3. Data and Analysis 
3.1 Illinois County Government Unreserved General Fund Balances  
Figure 2 shows that Illinois counties maintained unassigned fund balances with 
considerable variability in FY 2015.  The table presents the unreserved or unassigned fund 
balance for only 100 Illinois counties, data for two of the counties, Edwards and Scott, were not 
available. Specifically, the table shows that counties maintained a UFB level ranging from below 
0% to 134% of general fund expenditures.  Specifically, three counties had amounts below 0%, 
36 counties maintained amounts between 0% to 24%, Twenty-eight counties maintained 25 to 
45%, and 33 counties maintained amounts between 46 to 134%.  It is also noteworthy to mention 
that the GFOA suggests that the adequacy of the amount maintained should be based on the 
“government’s own specific circumstances,” but recommends that “at a minimum, that general-
purpose governments, regardless of size, maintain unreserved fund balance in the general fund of 
no less than 5 to 15% of regular general fund operating revenues, or no less than one to two 
months of regular general fund operating expenditures.”  They also acknowledge that a 
government’s particular situation may require them to maintain amounts that exceed this 
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recommendation (http://www.gfoa.org/services/rp/caafr/caafr-appropriate-level.pdf).  Further 
analysis shows that 14 of the 36 counties that fell within the 0 to 24% range met the GFOA 
recommendation and maintained the benchmark of 5 to 15%.  Overall, however, it appears that 
most of the counties (86) maintained levels that exceed or fall below the GFOA recommendation 
(Carter and Vogt, 1989; Hembree et al., 1999; Marlowe, 2005; Stewart, 2009, 2001a; Wang and 
Hou, 2012).  
 
 
Figure 2. UFB as a percent of GF Expenditures for 2015.  Source: County CAFRs for 2016. 
N = 100.  
What seems clear is that many counties maintain savings well in excess of the GFOA 
recommendations.  There is concern that currently there may be too much room for abuse and 
lack of transparency as a result of a lack of adequately stringent legal or policy guidelines  
(Stewart et al., 2015).   
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 This analysis uses the GFOA Unreserved Reserve Fund sample policy as the basis for 
assessing Illinois counties’ unreserved general fund balances.  The Government Financial 
Officers Association recognize the need for governments to maintain sufficient levels of reserve 
funds to mitigate financial risks, such as revenue shortfalls, drastic budget cuts, and 
unanticipated emergency expenditures but also seeks to promote transparency and public 
accountability.  To these ends, it created a model policy to assist governments in formalizing the 
practice of holding a reserve fund.  In addition, the GFOA advocates that such funds may help 
stave off potential swings in tax rates caused by the lack of planning.  In developing a policy to 
govern unreserved fund balances, GFOA asks units of government to consider that more 
unreserved funds are needed if revenues are unpredictable and/or expenditures are volatile.  
Governments should also anticipate substantial one-time outlays brought about by disasters, 
immediate capital needs, or state budget cuts.  In setting unreserved fund levels, it is also 
important to consider covering the potential drain upon general fund resources from other funds 
as well as the availability of resources in other funds.  It is also important to consider the 
potential impact on the entity’s bond ratings and the corresponding increased cost of borrowed 
funds as well as the commitments and assignments (i.e., governments may wish to maintain 
higher levels of unreserved fund balances to compensate for any portion of an unreserved fund 
balance already committed or assigned by the government for a specific purpose) (GFOA, 2016.  
Best Practice: Appropriate Level of Unreserved Fund Balance in the General Fund.  
www.gfoa.org).    
 Based on these considerations, we applied five essential criteria in an analysis of Illinois 
county policies.  If a county adopted a formal policy, we also determined whether the policy 
contained language explaining the need for the fund to the public.  Next the policy was analyzed 
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to see if it recommended a specific funding level.  Third, the analysis determined whether the 
policy conformed to GFOA’s recommended funding level of always having no less than two 
months of operating funds on hand.  Policies were also checked to see whether there was 
language regulating how the unreserved reserves funds could be spent.  Finally, the policy was 
checked to see whether there was language addressing how the unreserved reserve fund was to 
be replenished if it was expended.  The five GFOA variables in this analysis include:   
• evidence of the county adopting a formal unreserved reserve fund policy;  
• policy language explaining the need for an unreserved reserve fund; 
• policy language specifying the fund level of two months of operations or greater; 
• policy language that regulates how the unreserved reserve fund may be spent; and 
• policy language that specifies how the unreserved reserve fund is to be replenished.  
 In addition, we assessed whether the policy addressed any of these three additional financial 
details: 
• policy language specifying the minimum unreserved fund balance; 
• policy language specifying the maximum unreserved fund balance; and 
• fiscal year 2014 unreserved fund balances as reported in the annual financial audit. 
 Illinois has 102 counties with only 18 that have fund balance policies (see the map in  
Appendix 1).  The fund policy analysis of these eighteen counties was derived by applying these 
criteria, including the five based upon the GFOA recommendations for county unreserved 
reserve fund policies.  The additional criteria identify greater financial details of unreserved 
reserve fund policies and practices at the county level.   
 
3.2 Unreserved Fund Balance Policy Findings 
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Table 2 shows that of the 102 Illinois counties, only 18 (Carroll, Champaign, Cook, 
DeKalb, Douglas, DuPage, Jo Daviess, Kane, Kankakee, Kendall, Lake, Macoupin, McHenry, 
Peoria, Rock Island, Tazewell, Vermillion, and Will)  have some form of an official public 
policy or published public statement directing the County Board on its use of 
Unreserved/Unassigned reserve funds.  Thus, only 18% of Illinois counties have adopted an 
unreserved/unassigned reserve fund policy or statement.  Most of these counties are in 
Northeastern Illinois and include Cook and the five Collar Counties, or in Northwestern Illinois 
with a scattering of other counties in Central Illinois.  There are no Metro-East or southern 
Illinois counties included.   
In reviewing the 18 policies, Kankakee County is the only county to meet all five GFOA 
unreserved reserve fund policy recommendations that include: explaining the need for the fund 
policy, specifying the fund level, keeping no less than two months of operating reserves in the 
fund, language regulating how the fund is to be spent, and language that specifies how the fund 
is to be replenished if spent.  Thus, only 1% of Illinois counties have adopted an 
unreserved/unassigned reserve fund policy or statement that meets all five recommended policy 
specifications per GFOA guidelines. 
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Table 2. 
Illinois Counties with Fund Balance Policies 
 
County *Formal 
Policy 
*Explains Need for 
Fund
*Specifies Fund Level *> 2 Months of 
Operating Revenue 
Minimum 
Specified 
Maximum 
Specificed
*Regulates 
Expenditures
*Specifies 
Replenishment
Professional 
County 
Administrator
Fund Balance as a 
Percentage of 
Expenditures
Carroll Yes- 
ordinance
Yes- avoid revenue 
shortfall
Yes- 30% Yes
Minimum 30% 
of annual 
operations
No No Yes- create plan to 
restore
No 43%
Champaign
Yes- 
published 
policies 
Yes- meet reserve 
policy, avoid future 
debt, repay debt
Yes- 12.5% No
45 day 
minimum or 
12.5%
No- will  create 
plan to spend 
surplus
No
Yes- will  create plan 
to restore Yes 14%
Cook
Yes- 
published 
policies 
Yes- protect against 
reducing services, 
raising taxes, 
revenue shortfalls, 
or 1 time 
1 to 2 months audited 
operating 
expenditures
Yes- 2 months is 
maximum
Yes- 1 month is 
minimum
Yes- 2 months 
is maximum No
Yes- a plan must be 
developed to replace No 5%
DeKalb
Yes- 
published 
policies 
Primary reason is 
to plan for 
contingencies 
(emergencies)  
Yes Yes
Yes- 4 months 
is minimum No No No plan to restore Yes 28%
Douglas
Yes- 
published 
policies 
Yes- l ists several 
objectives to ensure 
fiscal stabil ity
Yes No- 1 month Yes-1 month
No- specifies 
how surplus 
MAY be spent
No
Yes- create a plan to 
restore No 19%
DuPage
Yes- 
published 
as part of 
annual 
Yes- for major 
emergency or 
economic distress
Yes Yes
Yes- 3 months 
(25%) No No No No 49%
Jo Daviess
Yes- annual 
ordinance
Yes- to ensure 
sufficient revenues 
against shortfalls, 
unforeseen 
emergencies, and 
l  i h GASB 
Yes Yes
Yes- 3 months 
of operating 
expenses
No
Yes-says it's not 
scheduled for 
expense during 
FY17. 
No Yes 55%
Kane
Yes- 
published 
policies 
Yes- operating 
contingencies, 
unforeseen capital 
expenditures, 
emergencies, and 
protect against 
Yes-County Corporate 
Fund      No- Special 
Reserve Fund, 
Emergency Reserve 
Fund, Property Tax 
Freeze Protection 
Yes- Corporate Fund
Yes- Corporate 
Fund: 3 months 
of operating 
expenses
No
No- Corporate Fund   
Yes-Special 
Reserve, Emergency 
Reserve, and 
Property Tax Freeze 
Protection Funds 
No No 69%
Kankakee
Yes- 
published 
policies via 
resolution 
Yes- mitigate 
current & future 
risk, revenue 
shortfalls, 
unanticipated 
Yes- 20% Yes Yes- 15% to 20%
Yes-20% is max, 
spend on non-
recurring
Yes- order of 
expenditures from 
accounts
Yes-reduce 
expenditures, 
increase revenue
No -17%
Kendall
Yes- Board 
Resolution
Yes- to fund current 
and future 
operations, capital 
needs, and cash 
flow 
Yes- 6 to 7 monts of 
reserves Yes
Yes- 6 months 
(50% of 
operating cost)
Yes- 7 months, 
transfer 
overage to 
capital fund
No
Yes- reduce 
expenditures, 
increase revenue
Yes 71%
Lake
Yes- 
printed in 
annual 
budget
Yes- to maintain 
financial stabil ity 
due to temporary 
revenue shortfalls, 
emergencies, 
economic 
 
Yes- 15% of annual 
operations
No- 1.5 months 1.5 months
No- balance 
may exceed 
15% of annual 
operations for 
capital projects 
or other one 
 
Yes- after 
contingency funds 
are exhausted and 
per a plan to 
address the 
situation 
No Yes 19%
Macoupin
Yes- 
printed in 
annual 
budget
Yes- to preserve 
services
Yes- 15% of General 
Funds annual 
operations
No- sl ightly less No
yes- not to 
exceed 15% of 
County's most 
recent General 
Fund budget
Yes- by a 2/3rds 
vote of Board, can 
NOT be used for 
capital projects  
No No 34%
McHenry
Yes- annual 
budget 
resolution 
and 
published 
Yes- concerns over 
general economic 
conditions and 
reality imposed by 
the Property Tax 
Yes- 150 days of 
operations
Yes- 5 months Yes- 100 days 
of operations
Yes- will  
approve plan to 
spend down 
balance above 
150 day reserve
No
Yes- if below 100 day 
operations, Finance & 
Audit will  develop 
plan to restore
Yes 47%
Peoria
Yes- annual 
budget & 
audit 
Yes- to maintain 
credit rating, meet 
shortfalls
Yes- 24% of annual 
operations Yes- 3 months
Yes- 24% of 
annual 
operations
No- specifies 
how surplus 
MAY be spent
No
Yes- if falls below 
24%, County shall  
rebuild the balance 
within 1 yr.
Yes 20%
Rock Island Yes- Annual 
Budget
Yes- to guard 
against service 
disruption due to 
unexpected revenue 
shortfall  or 
unpredicted 
Yes- 20% of annual 
expenditures
Yes-slightly more
Yes- 20% of 
annual 
expenditures
No No
Yes- acknowledge ok 
to fall  below and may 
take time to rebuild 
No 12%
Tazewell
Yes- 
statement 
in annual 
audit
No
Yes-33% of projected 
expenditures Yes- 4 months
Yes- 33% or 4 
months No No No Yes 71%
Vermilion Yes- annual 
budget
No Yes Yes 25% of annual 
appropriation
No No No No 77%
Will
Yes- 
statement 
in annual 
CAFR
No
Yes-25% (3 months of 
operations) Yes- 3 months 22%
Yes- if exceeds 
26% Finance 
Committee 
shall  
recommend 
 
No
Yes- if falls below 
22%, Finance 
Committee will  
recommend corrective 
action 
No
28%
Note: * GFOA Recommended
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 As shown in Table 3, nine counties (Carroll, Champaign, Cook, DeKalb, Douglas, Kane, 
Kankakee, Kendall, and McHenry) have identifiable formal unreserved reserve fund polices 
either through fiscal policy statements or via published board resolutions or ordinances per the 
recommendation of the GFOA.  The remaining nine counties (DuPage, Jo Daviess, Lake, 
Macoupin, Peoria, Rock Island, Tazewell, Vermillion, and Will) have formal policy statements 
published in annual budgets, financial plans, or audits.  
 In reviewing the 18 counties with a formal statement, 15 (Carroll, Champaign, Cook, 
DeKalb, Douglas, DuPage, Jo Daviess, Kane, Kankakee, Kendall, Lake, Macoupin, McHenry, 
Peoria, and Rock Island) have language explaining the need for the fund per the 
recommendations of the GFOA.  This equates to only 15% of Illinois counties having adopted an 
unreserved/unassigned reserve fund policy or statement to explain the need for the fund in accord 
with GFOA guidelines.  Moreover, 14 counties (Carroll, Cook, DeKalb, DuPage, Jo Daviess, 
Kane, Kankakee, Kendall, McHenry, Peoria, Rock Island, Tazewell, Vermillion and Will) have 
language that meets the GFOA recommendations of specifying a reserve fund balance of two 
months or more of operating revenues. This leaves us with four counties (Champaign, Douglas, 
Lake, and Macoupin) with policy statements failing to meet the minimum reserve fund threshold 
of no less than two months of operations.  Thus, we find that only 14% of Illinois counties meet 
GFOA guidelines with a formal policy to hold at least two months of operating revenue in 
reserve.  When it comes to policy language regulating how the unreserved reserve fund is to be 
spent,  only four counties (Jo Daviess, Kankakee, Lake, and Macoupin) include language 
regulating expenditures per GFOA guidelines, however 10 counties (Carroll, Champaign, Cook, 
Douglas, Kankakee, Kendall, McHenry, Peoria, Rock Island, and Will) have language built into 
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policy statements specifying how the unreserved reserve fund is to be replenished if funds fall 
below the minimum balance expended per GFOA guidelines. It is noteworthy that only four 
counties out of 18 or 4% of Illinois counties have an unreserved/unassigned reserve fund policy 
or statement adopted language that regulated how the unreserved/unassigned reserve fund could 
be spent in accord with the recommendations of GFOA guidelines, while 10% of Illinois 
counties adopted language that specified how the reserve fund was to be replenished per the 
recommendations of the GFOA guidelines. 
 Further analysis found that six Illinois counties (Cook, Kankakee, Lake, Macoupin, 
McHenry, and Will) in the sample of those with some GFOA unreserved reserve fund policy 
language, adopted language placing a cap on the maximum amount that may be accumulated in 
the unreserved reserve fund.  The maximum reserve fund cap ranges from no more than two 
months of reserves (Cook County) to no more than seven months per Kendall County.  Thus, it is 
surprising that only 6% of all Illinois counties adopted some type of regulatory language placing 
a cap on the maximum amount of tax dollars that that may be accumulated in an 
unassigned/unreserved reserve fund.  
 To understand why certain counties adopted unassigned/unreserved reserve fund policies or 
statements, we examined whether those counties had professional county administrators.  Of the 
18 counties with an unreserved/unassigned reserve fund policy or statement, eight, or almost 
half, (Champaign, DeKalb, Jo Daviess, Kendall, Lake, McHenry, Peoria, and Tazewell) operated 
with a professional county administrator.  Statewide, there are 24 counties that have a 
professional county administrator.  Therefore, it does not appear that by hiring a professional 
county administrator a county is necessarily more likely to adopt an unassigned/unreserved 
reserve fund policy.  Lastly, when it comes to the form of county government, commissioner vs. 
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non-commissioner, all 18 (Carroll, Champaign, Cook, DeKalb, Douglas, DuPage, Jo Daviess, 
Kane, Kankakee, Kendall, Lake, Macoupin, McHenry, Peoria, Rock Island, Tazewell, 
Vermillion, and Will) with an unreserved/unassigned reserve fund policy or statement operate in 
a non-commission form of county government.  Given there are 102 counties that may choose 
what form of government for which to operate, it is noteworthy that 100% of Illinois counties 
that adopted an unreserved/unassigned reserve fund policy or statement operate in a non-
commission form of government.   
 To deepen our analysis, we ranked the 102 Illinois counties and pulled out the 18 counties 
with an unassigned/unreserved reserve fund policy or statement by five variables: population, per 
capita income, median household income, unreserved fund balance, and unreserved balance as a 
percent of total annual expenditures as presented in Table 3.  When reviewing state population 
by county, the top six counties in population (Cook, DuPage, Lake, Will, Kane, and McHenry) 
account for 65% of the total Illinois population as of 2010 census; and these all have an 
unreserved reserve fund policy.  When we expand this ranking, 15 out of the 18 counties 
(Champaign, Cook, DeKalb, DuPage, Kane, Kankakee, Kendall, Lake, Macoupin, McHenry, 
Peoria, Rock Island, Tazewell, Vermillion, and Will) account for 69% of the total Illinois 
population and have an unreserved reserve fund policy.  Thus, the higher the county population, 
the more likely it is to have an unreserved reserve fund policy.   
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Table 3. 
Illinois Counties Rankings with Fund Balance Policies and Statements 
County Population Per Capita Income 
Median 
Household 
Income 
Unassigned 
Fund 
Balance 
UFB as 
Percent of 
Total Annual 
Expenditure 
Carroll 75 22 48 58 41 
Champaign 10 35 64 23 77 
Cook 1 9 18 1 88 
DeKalb 20 41 23 18 58 
Douglas 58 74 35 76 72 
DuPage 2 2 2 2 31 
Jo Daviess 54 17 30 29 26 
Kane 5 7 7 3 19 
Kankakee 18 55 34 96 102 
Kendall 16 5 1 8 17 
Lake 3 1 3 6 71 
Macoupin 32 51 36 40 52 
McHenry 6 3 4 5 33 
Peoria 12 12 37 15 67 
Rock Island 14 26 47 37 81 
Tazewell 15 15 15 7 16 
Vermillion 21 85 82 14 14 
Will 4 6 5 4 59 
Sources: (Census, 2016) and (Services, 2013). 
 
 The per capita income variable ranking shows that the top 5 out of 6 counties (Lake, DuPage, 
McHenry, Kendall, and Will) have an unreserved reserve fund policy.  If we expand this ranking 
slightly, the top 10 out of 17 counties (Cook, DuPage, Jo Daviess, Kane, Kendall, Lake, 
McHenry, Peoria, Tazewell, and Will) in per capita income have an unreserved reserve fund 
policy.  Thus, just like our population variable, the higher the county per capita income, the more 
likely a county is to have an unreserved reserve fund policy. 
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 When we looked at Illinois income data by household, we found similar results as with per 
capita income in that 16 of the 18 counties (Carroll, Cook, DeKalb, Douglas, DuPage, Jo 
Daviess, Kane, Kankakee, Kendall, Lake, Macoupin, McHenry, Peoria, Rock Island, Tazewell, 
and Will) with an unreserved reserve fund policy are in the top 50% of county rankings.  Again, 
the higher the county median household income, the more likely the county is to have an 
unreserved reserve fund policy.   
 Similarly, we expected to find that the county with larger unassigned/unreserved reserve fund 
balance would also be more likely to have a formal reserve policy. Not surprising, eight out of 
the top nine counties (Cook, DuPage, Kane, Kendall, Lake, McHenry, Tazewell, and Will) with 
the largest unreserved/unassigned reserve fund balances adopted a reserve fund policy.  As 
expected, the higher the unreserved reserve fund balance, the more likely that county is to have 
an unreserved reserve fund policy. 
 However, when we ranked all 102 counties by unassigned/unreserved reserve fund balance 
as a percent of total annual expenditures, our expectations did not hold.  No county with an 
unreserved/unassigned reserve fund balance equal to or greater than 80% or more of annual 
operating expenditures had an unreserved reserve fund policy.  Of the 18 counties with 
unreserved/unassigned reserve fund policies, the average balance equaled 35.7% of total annual 
expenditures for all counties.  This contrasts with average balance of 38.7% of the total annual 
expenditures for the remaining 84 counties with unreserved/unassigned reserve fund but no 
formal policy or statement. Therefore, it appears that the higher the unreserved/unassigned 
reserve fund balance as a percent of annual expenditures, the less likely a county is to have an 
unreserved reserve fund policy.  
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 Based on these observations, we further assessed these antecedents of county adoption of an 
unreserved fund balance policy by estimating a logistic regression equation.  The dependent 
variable for the analysis was whether a county had a general fund unreserved fund policy.  The 
independent variables for the analysis were 2015 estimated county population, 2015 estimated 
median family income, ideology (percent of the vote for Clinton in 2016), general fund 
unreserved fund balance as a proportion of total expenditures (2015), and the type of county 
government form.  Based on what the analysis has shown so far, we expect that population will 
affect policy adoption positively. We also expect wealthier, more liberal counties will have a 
policy. There appears to be some findings to suggest that the form of government affects local 
government financial administration (Desantis and Renner, 1994; Marlowe, 2005; Stewart, 
2011).  Svara (1998), Marlowe (2004), and (Stewart, 2011) caution that reformed local 
government impacts may be difficult to disentangle as reform structures generally exhibit hybrid 
characteristics tempering progressivism with political accountability.  While professional 
administrators may be on point where policymaking is concerned, elected officials tend to impact 
implementation of policy and its administration regardless of the type of structure.   
Similarly in Illinois, the more progressive township government form supersedes the traditional, 
commission county government form (Banovetz and Peters, 2006).  It is expected that its impact 
will also be positive.  Finally, the preceding analysis argues that counties with larger proportions 
of fund balances unreserved will be less likely to have a policy.  Two counties did not post 
CAFRs so there are 100 cases. The results are presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4.  
 
Logistic Regression Predicting County Adoption of Unreserved Fund Balance Policy 
 
   
Variable Odds Ratio Standard Error 
Pop Est 2015 1.00* .0000 
Med Income 1.00** .0000 
Ideology 1.15*** .0598 
Township Govt Form 4.30 4.07 
Unreserved Fund as a % of Expenditures 2.06 2.37 
Constant .00001** .000005 
   
N=100   
LR chi2 (5) = 44.21   
Prob > chi2 =.0000   
Pseudo R2 = .47   
Log Likelihood = -25.032   
* p > .10 ; ** p > .05; *** p > .001   
 
 The overall model performs well with Chi2 = .0000 and the pseudo R2 = .46.  Two of the 
variables are positive and statistically significant at the .05 level (i.e., income and ideology) and 
population is significant at the .10 level.  We expected that township county fund balances would 
be more transparent – township counties as opposed to commission ones would be more likely to 
have policies for unreserved funds.  The sign of the variable distinguishing township commission 
counties is positive as expected but at .12 just misses statistical significance.  Unreserved fund 
levels as a proportion of total expenditures are not statistically significant when considering the 
other variables.  Therefore, the findings for the most part confirm our initial expectations.  
Larger, wealthier counties are more likely to have a policy, as are counties that are more liberal.  
The other counties in Illinois, especially the mid-sized, and even the smaller and more rural 
counties may well want to consider the advantages of adopting unreserved fund level 
policies, and certainly county officials in all Illinois counties would be prudent to pay close 
attention to the levels of funds available in these fund accounts.   
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4. Discussion and Conclusion  
 This comprehensive state analysis sheds some light on the types of Illinois counties that 
adopt formal unreserved reserve fund policies.  Even though this comprehensive review of all 
102 counties in Illinois is relatively large, only a small number, 18 counties (18%) actually have 
unreserved/unassigned reserve fund policies or statements.  The operation of 18% of Illinois 
counties adopting formal policies needs to be further reviewed and compared to other states. This 
finding should also be compared to longitudinal data to identify if there is progress or stagnation 
in the adoption of such policies in Illinois.  For example, it would be interesting to learn if the 
adoption of a formal policy results from an audit finding, the demand for transparency by 
taxpayers, from past questionable expenditures, or from unplanned emergencies.  This 
information may be helpful for the GFOA as it seeks to improve transparency and for 
bonding agencies as they seek dedicated revenue sources. 
 It is significant to note that only one county in the 102 Illinois county sample complies with 
all five of the GFOA recommended unreserved reserve fund policy recommendations, thus only 
1% of Illinois counties completely comply with GFOA guidelines.  This observation includes 
even some counties with a professional county administrator failing to adopt all the 
recommended policy language that regulates expenditures.  Of particular note, only four counties 
out of 102 (4%) address how the unreserved reserve fund is to be spent, while 10 counties have 
adopted language for how it is to be replenished through formal policy.  This observation could 
be a function of county officials and administrators not wanting to limit themselves on how to 
expend the funds nor bind themselves to having to rebuild the fund, but this research is 
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inconclusive.  Future research may wish to address that reluctance or make 
recommendations to improve compliance for transparency and accountability.  
 Of the 24 Illinois counties with a professional county administrator (out of our sample of 102 
total Illinois counties), eight adopted formal unreserved reserve fund policies.  This observation 
contrasts with those Illinois counties without a professional county administrator adopting a 
formal policy by a ten to eight county ratio.  Thus, in our sample, only 1/3rd or 33% of 
professionally managed counties adopted formal unreserved reserve fund policies.  By contrast, 
this means that 2/3rds of professionally managed counties in Illinois have not adopted a fund 
policy or statement.  The findings suggest that professionally managed counties are less 
likely to adopt formal fund policies than counties without such professional management 
and guidance.  Masters of Public Administration programs may wish to include training to 
address the need for reserve fund policies and how to develop and implement these policies. 
 In a similar finding, 100% of the counties that adopted some type of unassigned/unreserved 
reserve fund policy or statement operated under a non-commission form of county government.  
Therefore, through further study, we may be able to assume that non-commission forms of 
governance are more likely to adopt formal fund policies than commissioner-governed counties.  
This observation may assist the GFOA as it seeks to educate county governments in the 
need for formal policies by designing material targeting commissioners. 
 One notable finding was that only six counties with a formal unreserved reserve fund policy 
or statement included language to set a maximum cap on the fund.  This contrasts with 
recommended GFOA language to set a minimum balance of at least two months of operating 
cash, which equals 16% of the annual operations.  In fact, 17 out of the 18 counties set some sort 
of minimum thresholds with 14 of those meeting the minimum two-month recommendation.  
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Future research may wish to address the need for maximum fund caps to improve public 
transparency and accountability and over guidelines and policy language.  Future research 
also needs to ponder the impact that ideology has in our multivariate model and the 
implication this may raise for transparency and citizen participation in the budgeting 
process. 
 In relationship to the size of the county, it appears that counties with larger populations tend 
to have larger unreserved reserve fund balances and are more likely to adopt unreserved reserve 
fund policies.  The top six counties in population (Cook, DuPage, Lake, Will, Kane, and 
McHenry account for 65% of the total Illinois population) are the same counties with the largest 
unreserved/unassigned reserve fund balances, all of which have an unreserved reserve fund 
policy.  Population size and income are both positive and statistically significant variables in the 
multivariable model.  This observation may help associations such as GFOA and bonding 
agencies design and develop education and training workshops for smaller county 
governments to assist them with adopting formal unreserved reserve fund policies and 
thereby improving fiduciary responsibilities and accountability.  
 Lastly, we noted that the higher the average reserve fund balance is in relationship to annual 
operating expenditures, the less likely that county is to have a formal unassigned/unreserved 
reserve fund policy.  However, the variable is not statistically significant in the multivariate 
model.  This contrasts with the finding that the higher the fund dollar amount the more likely the 
county is to have a formal policy.  Although more research needs to be done to fully understand 
this relationship, it appears that a large cash balance may trigger greater audit scrutiny and the 
need for an unassigned/unreserved reserve fund policy, while those counties with smaller cash 
balances, but with a greater balance in relationship to annual expenditures, are able to avoid such 
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audit inquiry and retain fiscal flexibility.  These are all interesting findings which should be 
useful for county and state level officials and to the relevant professional associations such as the 
GFOA as well as faculty in Master of Public Administration programs.        
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Appendix 1 
Map of the Counties in Illinois with Fund Balance Policies 
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